R.D. Andrus v. The State of Utah : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
R.D. Andrus v. The State of Utah : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ralph L. Jerman; B.L. Dart Jr.; Jerman and Dart; Attorneys for Defendant.
Merlin R. Lybbert; David W. Slagle; Worsley, Snow and Christensen; Attorneys for Defendants; John
S. Boyden; John Paul Kennedy; George J. Romney; Boyden and Kennedy; Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Andrus v. Utah, No. 13716.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/878
UMENT 
;KETH»OL 
IfTAH $U*RtM£ QOURT 
+&/Ht 
RECEIVED 
^ L I B R A R Y 
DEC 6 1975 
THORPE, MARILYN R. BOWTHORPE, ROBERSiAll YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
P. CARLISLE, NORMA DEAN CARLISLE,^^ 1 *™
 r | , . c l Q Q l 
ARTHUR CHILD, EDITH c. CHILD, CHARite^euben Clark Law xnooi 
F. CONTANT, AGNES A. CONTANT, GENE \T. 
CRAWFORD, SHERRY T. CRAWFORD, GARY 
A. FLANDRO, CHERI P. FLANDRO, IRWIN C. 
GLASER, FRAYDELL Z. GLASER, THOMAS E. 
HAGERMAN, JOYCE L. HAGERMAN, KEITH \ 
H. HARDY, ANNETTE H. HARDY, RONALD C. 
JONES, JOHANNA JONES, F. SCOTT KIRK, 
PEARL B. KIRK, CLYDE B. KIRKHAM, 
ERMA KIRKHAM, ROBERT P. KUNKEL, 
FRANCES KUNKEL, EUGENE C. LLOYD, 
LAURIE LLOYD, BARNARD J. McENTEE, 
ELIZABETH C. McENTEE, WILLIAM J. MER-
BACK, GLORIA D. MERBACK, HEBER C. 
PETERSON, CAROLYN T. PETERSON, ELEA-
NOR E. PRADO, EDWIN A. READ, JOY E. 
READ, CECIL O. SAMUELSON, JANET M. 
SAMUELSON, NISHAN H. SHERANIAN, I 
MARILYNN J. SHERANIAN, FARRELL M. 
SMITH, SANDRA R. SMITH, ANGUS K. ) Case No. 
SPROUL, LOIS B. SPROUL, FRANK M. STEIN- f 13710 
HARDT, EVA STEINHARDT, RICHARD R. 
TWELVES, VIRGINIA HALE TWELVES, SHIRL 
J. VARTY, RAMONA VARTY, J. ROBERT 
WELCH, DOROTHY K. WELCH, CLAUDE L. 
WESTENSKOW, and GLADYS B. WESTEN-
SKOW, Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH and its DEPARTMENT OF 
HIGHWAYS, SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of Utah, and GIBBONS 
& REED CO., a Utah corporation, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ROBERT J. CAMERON, 
vs. 
J. P. GIBBONS, dba GIBBONS & REED 
STRUCTION COMPANY, the STATE OF UTl 
a sovereign, and the COUNTY OF SALT LAi 
Defendants-Appelle 
RICHARD GROTEPAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. J. P. GIBBONS, dba GIBBONS & REED C O N -
STRUCTION COMPANY, and the STATE OF 
UTAH, a sovereign, Defendants-Appellees. 
^iW9.-^975 
CWi 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
GIBBONS & REED COMPANY 
ON CROSS APPEAL OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
(over) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of 
Salt Lake County, The Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., Judge 
Ralph L. Jerman 
B. L. Dart, Jr . 
JERMAN & DART 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent 
Gibbons & Reed Company 
430 Ten Broadway Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 521-6383 
Merlin R. Lybbert 
David W. Slagle 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees 
State of Utah and Salt Lake County 
Seventh Floor Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 521-9000 
John S. Boyden 
John Paul Kennedy 
George J. Romney 
BOYDEN & KENNEDY 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
1000 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: 521-0800 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF T H E CASE 2 
ARGUMENT 2 
POIN I 
T H E TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
REFUSING TO ALLOW T H E STATE 
OF UTAH TO RECOVER JUDGMENT 
OVER AGAINST GIBBONS & REED 
COMPANY ON AN INDEMNITY 
THEORY AND DISMISSING ITS 
CROSS-CLAIM 2 
CONCLUSION 8 
Appendix "A" Ai 
Appendix "B" Aiii 
CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
Smith v. Ireland, 4 Utah 187, 7 Pac. 749 (19) 8 
1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In The Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
R. D. ANDRUS, VIRGINIA M. ANDRUS, JAN D. I 
BATES, ANN K. BATES, LLOYD N. BECK-
STEAD, JUNE H. BECKSTEAD, JESSE N. BEN-
SON, ESTELLA D. BENSON, BRUCE R. BOW-
THORPE, MARILYN R. BOWTHORPE, ROBERT 
P. CARLISLE, NORMA DEAN CARLISLE, 
ARTHUR CHILD, EDITH C. CHILD, CHARLES 
F. CONTANT, AGNES A. CONTANT, GENE V. 
CRAWFORD, SHERRY T. CRAWFORD, GARY 
A. FLANDRO, CHERI P. FLANDRO, IRWIN C. 
GLASER, FRAYDELL Z. GLASER, THOMAS E. 
HAGERMAN, JOYCE L. HAGERMAN, KEITH 
H. HARDY, ANNETTE H. HARDY, RONALD C. 
JONES, JOHANNA JONES, F. SCOTT KIRK, 
PEARL B. KIRK, CLYDE B. KIRKHAM, 
ERMA KIRKHAM, ROBERT P. KUNKEL, 
FRANCES KUNKEL, EUGENE C. LLOYD, 
LAURIE LLOYD, BARNARD J. McENTEE, 
ELIZABETH C. McENTEE, WILLIAM J. MER- I 
BACK, GLORIA D. MERBACK, HEBER C. I 
PETERSON, CAROLYN T. PETERSON, ELEA- I 
NOR E. PRADO, EDWIN A. READ, JOY E. I 
READ, CECIL O. SAMUELSON, JANET M. 
SAMUELSON, NISHAN H. SHERANIAN, 
MARILYNN J. SHERANIAN, FARRELL M. 
SMITH, SANDRA R. SMITH, ANGUS K. I Case No. 
SPROUL, LOIS B. SPROUL, FRANK M. STEIN- >
 1 q 7 1 f t 
HARDT, EVA STEINHARDT, RICHARD R. xot 1 0 
TWELVES, VIRGINIA HALE TWELVES, SHIRL 
J. VARTY, RAMONA VARTY, J. ROBERT 
WELCH, DOROTHY K. WELCH, CLAUDE L. I 
WESTENSKOW, and GLADYS B. WESTEN- I 
SKOW, Plaintiffs-Appellants, I 
vs. I 
STATE OF UTAH and its DEPARTMENT OF I 
HIGHWAYS, SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of Utah, and GIBBONS 
& REED CO., a Utah corporation, 
Defendants-Appellees. ROBERT J. CAMERON, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
J. P. GIBBONS, dba GIBBONS & REED CON-
STRUCTION COMPANY, the STATE OF UTAH, 
a sovereign, and the COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
RICHARD GROTEPAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
J. P. GIBBONS, dba GIBBONS & REED CON-
STRUCTION COMPANY, and the STATE OF 
UTAH, a sovereign, Defendants-Appellees. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
GIBBONS & REED COMPANY 
ON CROSS APPEAL OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
S T A T E M E N T OF T H E CASE 
Statements as to Nature of the Case, Disposition 
in Lower Court, Relief Sought on Appeal and a State-
ment of Facts appear in the brief of defendant-respond-
ent Gibbons & Reed Company, previously filed herein. 
The purpose of this brief is to answer, as cross-respond-
ents, the brief of defendant-respondent and cross-ap-
pellant State of Utah. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
The trial court did not err in refusing to allow the 
State of Utah to recover judgment over against Gib-
bons 8$ Reed Company on an indemnity theory and 
dismissing its cross-claim. 
The State of Utah's belated attempt to shift liabil-
ity to Gibbons & Reed is not warranted by the evidence, 
the findings of the jury, the actions of the trial court 
or the prior conduct of the State. I t is an unbelievable 
and wholly unjustified maneuver. Throughout these 
proceedings, the State has taken the position that Gib-
bons & Reed completely performed its contract for the 
construction of the interstate freeway, that it did not 
deviate from the plans and specifications furnished by 
the State; and that there is no area where blame could 
be placed upon Gibbons & Reed. This is true in the 
2 
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State's answer to the extensive interrogatories of plain-
tiffs (see, e.g., answers to interrogatories 61, 63, 64, 66, 
66(c), 77, 96, 101, 131, 136, 138, 142, 159 and 164. 
Italicized answers are reproduced at Appendix "A" 
(R, 350-399)). I t was also true throughout the testi-
mony at the trial. (T. 1406-9, T. 1488, T. 1516-20, T. 
1556, T. 1584-9). In now asserting that the trial court 
erred in refusing to enter a judgment for indemnity 
against Gibbons & Reed, the State ignores its previous 
expressions and overlooks other controlling factors. 
First, at the hearing on Gibbons & Reed's motion 
for summary judgment (R. 329-31), Mr. Slagle, at-
torney for the State of Utah, represented to the court 
that the State was not claiming a right of indemnifica-
tion against Gibbons & Reed unless it were held liable to 
plaintiffs by reason of the imputation of negligence to 
it on the basis of Gibbons & Reed's actions and not on 
the basis of its own culpability. I t was partially upon 
this representation that the motion for summary judg-
ment, as to the State's cross-claim, was disposed of. A 
letter (R. 741) confirming this understanding was for-
warded by Mr. Dart, one of the attorneys for Gibbons 
& Reed, to Mr. Slagle the day after the order denying 
the motion for summary judgment was signed, (see Ap-
pendix B) . The attorneys for the State orally acknowl-
edged at the time of the trial that the understanding 
in the letter was correct and have never expressed their 
disagreement with it. 
3 
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Apart from that understanding, the facts them-
selves do not support the broad claim for indemnifica-
tion now asserted by the State. To begin with, the State 
refers only to one of several provisions of the integrated 
contract bearing on the subject. When read in con-
junction with the other provisions (and viewed in light 
of the actions of the State following the flood) it can 
readily be seen that the rights of indemnity presently 
claimed by the State are not available to it. Section 
107.12 (Exh. B) , for example, provides; 
The Contractor shall be responsible for all 
damage or injury to property of any character, 
during the prosecution of the work, resulting 
from any act, omission, neglect, or misconduct 
in his manner or method of execution the work, 
or any time due to defective work or materials, 
and said responsibility will not be released until 
the project shall have been completed and ac-
cepted. The Contractor will not be responsible 
for damage to property due to design failure. 
[Emphasis added]. 
The last sentence of this section qualifies the gen-
eral responsibilities of the contractor, to provide that it 
will not be responsible where the damages were inher-
ent in or the fault of the design. In the present case, 
it is clear the jury found that the damages to the plain-
tiffs were caused by an inadequate and unsafe design. 
In the first interrogatory (Int. A, R. 721), it found 
that the highway project of the State, including the 
storm drain system, was unreasonably defective or dan-
4 
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gerous. In the light of the other evidence and findings, 
this could refer only to the overall concept, which re-
duces itself to a question of design. Admittedly, the 
jury answered that the State did not fail to furnish 
plans and specifications which were in accordance with 
approved engineering standards (Int. H , R. 728), but 
this relates only to whether the plans and specifications 
were properly prepared, not to the question of whether 
the design itself resulted resulted in the damages. The 
jury's answer to Interrogatory A is subject to only 
one interpretation, the damages were inherent in the 
design. 
Additionally, Section 107.16, the provision most 
clearly applicable, provides: 
. . . The Contractor shall . . . take every precau-
tion against injury or damage to [the works] by 
the action of the elements, vandalism, or from 
any other cause, whether rising from the execu-
tion or from the non-execution of the work. The 
Contractor shall rebuild, repair, restore and make 
good all injuries or damages to any portion of 
the work occasioned by any of the above causes 
before final acceptance and shall bear the ex-
pense thereof, except damage to the work due to 
unforseeable causes beyond the control of and 
without the fault or negligence of the contractor, 
including, but not restricted to acts of God or 
the public enemy or of governmental authorities. 
An act of God is construed to mean an earth-
quake, flood, cloudburst, cyclone, or other natural 
5 
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occurrence of unusual violence . . . The Commis-
sion shall be the sole judge as to whether a par-
ticular natural phenomenon shall be classed as 
an "act of God" or as a normal occurrence. 
[Emphasis added]. 
The italicized portion of the above section is un-
disputably more specific than the general language of 
Section 107.14 and should control. And, prior to the 
commencement of this action, the State, through the 
Commission, determined that the storm was of unusual 
violence, that the damages were beyond the control of 
the contractors and it paid Gibbons & Reed for all res-
toration and repair work necessitated by the flood. (T. 
1829). 
Gibbons & Reed agrees with the State's argument 
that indemnity agreements must be construed towards 
determining the actual intentions of the parties. I t sub-
mits, however, that in construing the above provisions 
as a whole (particularly in light of the actions of the 
parties following the flood) it is obvious that the con-
tentions of the State cannot prevail. Its statement (P. 
32) that "nothing could be a better example of 'damage 
received or sustained by any person, persons or prop-
erty on account of the operation of said contractor' than 
a flood caused by the construction of a highway," is 
incredible. Gibbons & Reed's construction did not, by 
any standard, cause the flooding and the State knows 
this. Its statement is completely at odds with the posi-
tion taken by the State throughout these entire proceed-
6 
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ings and it is disputed by the testimony of all of its 
witnesses, including its project engineer, who testified 
that the cloudburst was of such proportions that noth-
ing could have been done to prevent it. (T. 1516-17). 
I t is also completely at odds with the State's own fac-
tual statements. As it says in its brief (P. 6), the water 
which began to collect high in the Olympus Cove area 
"accumulated in ever increasing amounts and by the 
time it reached relocated Wasatch Boulevard, it was of 
torrent proportions." No amount of precautions could 
have restrained these waters from pouring over the east 
cut bank of the project and causing the damages they 
did. And, as pointed out in Gibbons & Reed's primary 
brief, the State-engineered collection system above the 
project was installed and operating. Thus, the State 
cannot logically charge Gibbons & Reed with a duty to 
foresee the damage to the project as a result of the 
record cloudburst. 
The Utah cases cited by the State relating to in-
demnification agreements do not support it. Even in 
the absence of the understanding between the attorneys 
(as expressed in the letter from Mr. Dart to Mr. 
Slagle), the result would be the same. Indemnity agree-
ments are not construed by this court to provide indem-
nification to one who is guilty of negligence, unless 
that result is clearly intended by the parties. Here, the 
provisions of the contract plainly show otherwise. The 
contractor was to be held liable only for damages re-
sulting from its own acts or negligence. 
7 
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Equally unsupportable is the State's contention 
that Gibbons & Reed was guilty of primary negligence 
and that the jury did not find the State was negligent. 
The trial court, pursuant to Rule 49(a), arrived at 
just the opposite conclusions after considering the find-
ings returned by the jury. In doing so, the trial court 
acted properly and within its discretion. In addition to 
the cases cited under Point I I of its primary brief, see 
Smith v. Ireland, 4 Utah 187, 7 Pac. 749 (1885), which 
make it clear that when special interrogatories are used, 
the court reserves the right to state the applicable con-
clusions of law after receiving the findings of the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
Upon all of the findings, the court was completely 
justified in ruling as it did. The factual findings, which 
were supported by the evidence, not only justified the 
conclusion reached and rulings made by the trial court, 
but, at least as they related to Gibbons & Reed, would 
not logically support any other decision. For these rea-
sons, the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Ralph L. Jerman, 
B. L. Dart, Jr., 
J E R M A N & D A R T 
8 
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A P P E N D I X "A" 
66(c) Was there anything further that Gibbons & 
Reed and/or their agents could have done in the opin-
ion of the State to minimize the possibility of flooding 
under the circumstances of this case? 
A N S W E R : No. 
131. Did the State and/or County or anyone on 
behalf of the State and/or County advise Gibbons & 
Reed or anyone on behalf of Gibbons & Reed of the 
possibility of floods, sudden showers, excess water run-
off, or drainage problems relating to the construction 
of Highway 1-215? 
A N S W E R : The Utah State Road Commission 
and its employees, officers and agents, were of the 
opinion that Gibbons & Reed was progressing with its 
consrtuction in a manner according to the contract, 
special provisions and standard specifications, at least 
as far as protection for floods, sudden showers, excess 
water runoff and drainage problems were concerned, 
and therefore saw no need to advise them of additional 
precautions that could have been taken. Furthermore, 
it is unknown to the officers, agents and officials of 
the Utah State Road Commission as to what additional 
precautions could have been taken to avoid damage to 
the residents in that area from the possibility of floods. 
At 
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136. Was the State and/or County aware of any 
steps being taken by Gibbons & Reed or anyone on its 
behalf to avoid the problems referred to in Question 
133? 
A N S W E R : To the best information, knowledge 
and belief of this defendant, Gibbons & Reed was tak-
ing all precautions reasonable and necessary to avoid 
any problems relating to the flood. 
164 (a) Was the construction of Highway 1-215 by 
Gibbons & Reed completed in the manner approved by 
the State? 
A N S W E R : Yes. 
A it 
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A P P E N D I X " B " 
David W.Slagle, Esq. 
Worsley, Snow & Christensen 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Andrus v. State of Utah, et al. 
Dear Dave: 
Enclosed find a copy of the order signed by Judge 
Baldwin on Wednesday, November 7,1973. 
I placed nothing in the order concerning our dis-
cussion in court and so I am covering my understanding 
in this letter of the position taken by the State of Utah 
in its cross-claim against Gibbons & Reed. 
I t is my understanding that the State is not claim-
ing any right of indemnification from Gibbons & Reed 
for the State's own negligence and the claim of the 
State, on its cross-claim, is based strictly on the theory 
that it is entitled to indemnification if it is found liable 
only because of the imputation of negligence to it by 
reason of the actions of Gibbons & Reed. 
If I am incorrect, please get in touch with me im-
mediately. 
Very truly yours, 
B. L. Dart, J r . 
BLD/ lg 
Enclosure 
A tit 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RECEIVED 
LAW LIBRARY, 
DEC 6 1975 
BRIGMAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
J. Reuben Clark Law School 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
